War in Ukraine: African farmers are not discovering food crises

The year 2022 promises to be one of the most challenging for agriculture and global food security, and concerns are already growing for 2023. Just as storms and droughts are becoming increasingly severe each year, crises in agricultural markets caused by geopolitical, climatic, or logistical shocks are following in their footsteps and are becoming increasingly serious. The military operations launched by Russia in Ukraine are having agricultural and food-related repercussions across the globe. As these lines are being written, the African continent is already feeling the economic, agricultural, and food-related consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The capacities of African states and the resilience of African societies are being tested by a supply shock that is increasing the risk of famine. At the same time, debates are polarizing around agricultural transformations in Africa, but also globally, while issues of sovereignty and dependency outside the continent are returning to the top of the agenda. While the risks of food insecurity are very real for African households, the crisis in Eastern Europe must not obscure the real challenges facing agriculture and food in Africa. Solutions aimed at meeting demand by producing more elsewhere, particularly in Europe, can only be short-term, or even counterproductive, if we do not address the challenges of agricultural production, adaptation to climate change, and building resilient sectors.

A global supply shock and its consequences

Half a billion people worldwide depend on Ukrainian agricultural production, and even more so on that of Russia. However, due to the Russian invasion, wheat, corn, and sunflower (oil/cake) are no longer loaded onto ships or leaving the Black Sea ports for transport to the countries that now depend on them. In the Global South, consumption of wheat and wheat-processed products has increased significantly, particularly in cities. Wheat flour has the advantage of being easy to make into bread, unlike other local grains such as sorghum or millet. Wheat bread is also socially valued and considered more convenient. Baguettes are thus widely accepted in the consumption habits of urban households in African capitals. Wheat production in Africa remains very low, however, and has not seen any significant increase in recent years, due in particular to its low competitiveness compared to subsidized wheat produced in Western or Eastern Europe. African countries produce between 22 and 25 million tonnes of wheat and import nearly 55 million tonnes, of which just over half goes to North Africa, which is less populated.[1].

Russia and Ukraine are very important suppliers for a large part of African countries. The Black Sea provides a significant supply to North Africa and the Middle East. Egypt, the world's largest importer, receives 60 billion tonnes of its wheat imports from Russia and 20 billion tonnes from Ukraine. South of the Sahara, Somalia (100 billion tonnes), Benin (100 billion tonnes), Sudan (75 billion tonnes), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Tanzania, Rwanda, Madagascar, and Congo depend on the two countries for more than 60 billion tonnes of wheat, according to UNCTAD.[2]In East Africa, 85 % of wheat demand is met via imports, which come in large proportions from Russia or Ukraine. Even if the quantities are much smaller in sub-Saharan Africa compared to the Maghreb, dependence on Ukraine and Russia for wheat, but also for sunflower oil, remains strong. It is however important to note that cities, as well as the countryside, do not feed only on imported wheat or rice, but also on local production of cereals, tubers or plantains which do not receive sufficient support to compete with imported production. Dependence on the outside, which varies from one country to another in Africa[3], is therefore a source of concern at a time when the agricultural and food situation is already very poor.

Rising prices and increased risks of food insecurity

The concern stems from the fact that Black Sea grain exports are currently blocked, and importing countries must quickly find alternatives to meet local demand. Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya are seeking alternative sources of supply at a time when commodity prices are soaring and some food-exporting countries are considering restricting trade to protect their markets. These supply difficulties for certain grains, such as wheat, raise fears of price increases for other grains. Indeed, with possible export restrictions and the widespread rise in input and freight prices (see below), the price of other grains, such as rice, could also experience an increase that would be difficult for governments and households in sub-Saharan Africa to absorb.

The FAO price index is already hitting new records. The 2008 highs were already reached in 2021 and have exploded since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Between 2019 and March 2022, global cereal prices increased by 48 billion tons, diesel prices by 85 billion tons, and input prices by 35 billion tons. In sub-Saharan Africa, the effects of these price increases vary, depending on local production capacity, the structure of economies (oil/gas or not), market size, the importance of cereal products in daily consumption, particularly in cities, and levels of import dependence.

The price of many basic food products is rising in sub-Saharan Africa, including wheat flour, sugar, oil, and potatoes. Cities are the first to be affected, prompting international organizations and some governments to discuss possible shortages or even food crises, rekindling the spectre of political instability and social movements against the high cost of living. It must be emphasized that the war in Ukraine and the rising prices of agricultural commodities are a cumulative factor of food insecurity in Africa. They are not the sole reason for the agricultural or food vulnerabilities experienced by some African countries today. The economic consequences of the pandemic, the precariousness of urban and rural households, the impacts of climate change, and local or regional conflicts are all factors that predated the war in Eastern Europe. A response in terms of additional supply from outside the continent is therefore not a viable long-term solution. Especially since the number of people without the economic means to feed themselves (between 800 million and one billion) has been rising again for the past 5 years, well before Vladimir Putin launched his offensive on Ukraine. In this regard, it should be remembered that food security is a multidimensional phenomenon that is not only linked to the quantity of agricultural products available but also, or even above all, to the ability of individuals to buy (or produce) their food. Access to food is therefore an essential element that geopolitical, climatic or economic shocks come to constrain. Moreover, if access to cereal products is an important factor in food security because they play a crucial role in daily calorie intake, access to meat, fruits and vegetables, and legumes is just as important. The price of these products is rising and could increase even more in the future, making their access even more difficult than it is today. The sharp rise in cereal prices worldwide should therefore not obscure the need to develop local sectors and production (cereals and others), but also to facilitate access to these foodstuffs which are essential to the nutritional dimension of food security.

Agricultural and industrial sovereignty in question

Another availability shock, this time within the continent, could occur in the future with rising fertilizer prices and threaten food security. This factor is closely linked to the situation in Ukraine and Russia, as the latter is the world's leading exporter of urea and the second largest exporter of potash and ammonia, needed for the production of nitrogen fertilizer. This destabilization of fertilizer markets comes as fertilizer prices have already increased in 2021 due to soaring natural gas prices, penalizing ammonia production. With fertilizer prices almost doubling since the summer of 2021, producers cannot acquire them, and African states will not be able to increase the subsidies they allocate to producers given their economic and financial situation. Even if they import less than other agricultural powers, the consequences for local production are likely to be significant. Indeed, in 2020, sub-Saharan African countries imported 5.6 million tonnes of nitrogen fertilizers, compared to 12 million for Brazil or 10 million for India. The use of organic or synthetic fertilizers is much lower in sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia or other regions of the world, despite commitments to increase fertilizer use made within the African Union at the Abuja summit in 2006. South Africa, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Kenya are the main importers, and Europe and the Middle East are the most important suppliers. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, imports relatively little fertilizer, and its level of dependence on Russia remains limited, but local production capacities are very low. As Kako Nubukpo points out,[4]In West Africa, no country produces fertilizer except Nigeria. The impact of rising input prices will therefore vary depending on the country, the production systems and the level of fertilizer use. In some countries, producers will have to absorb the cost of increased inputs, if they can, while elsewhere others will have no choice but to buy less, which will have consequences on the yields of certain crops. Such a scenario calls into question the ability of African countries to be sovereign in terms of food. While dependence on international markets is increasing (the share of imports in consumption has increased from 10 % in 1975 to 20 to 25 % today), the challenge of increasing production is becoming more acute, particularly in view of the dietary changes of a population expected to almost double by 2050.[5].

The solidarity promoted by governments, first and foremost that of France with the FARM (Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission) initiative launched by President Macron (not to be confused with the Foundation of the same name!), can be an emergency solution to cushion shocks, finance solutions to the crisis, or even ensure supplies to the World Food Program (WFP). However, tomorrow, other crises—climate, geopolitical, or economic—could erupt, and food systems in Africa would not be better prepared, becoming increasingly dependent on external sources. The profound transformation of agricultural production systems, in Africa or elsewhere, will require time, political mobilization, and funding. IPCC experts have reminded us that time may be running out.[6], let us hope that we will be able to win by mobilizing widely to build sustainable agricultural sectors.

[1] The continent imports around 17 million tonnes of rice and produces 38 million tonnes (FAOStat, 2020).

[2] UNCTAD, The impact on trade and development of the war in Ukraine, UNCTAD Rapid Assessments, March 16, 2022.

[3] Pierre Janin, “Africa’s Food Autonomy in Perspective”, in Demeter 2021 – Producing and feeding ourselves: the daily challenge of a disoriented world, under the direction of Sébastien Abis and Matthieu Brun, IRIS Editions, 2021.

[4] "The challenge is to increase agricultural production in Africa," Interview with Kako Nubukpo in The World, 1^er April 2022.

[5] See on this subject the study conducted by INRAE at the request of FARM, How can we ensure food availability on the African continent by 2050? (inrae.fr)

[6] Read the third part of 6^th IPCC assessment report published on April 4, 2022 (AR6 Climate change 2022: Mitigation of climate change) AR6 Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change — IPCC.