Mirror clauses: a whim of the rich?

Mirror clauses, which reflect the requirement for trading partners to comply with European production standards, occupy an important place on the French political agenda. While their environmental, health, and even competitive benefits (for French farmers) are well established, few analyses examine their perception by least developed countries. This article attempts to highlight the consequences of such clauses for these countries and shed light on their likely reactions.

With one month to go before the start of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, debates are crystallizing around the issue of mirror clauses on imported agricultural products. The Minister of Agriculture and Food, Julien Denormandie, has repeatedly stated that importing products that do not comply with EU production standards creates distortions of competition to the detriment of European, and, of course, French, farmers. There is no shortage of arguments to fuel the debate, but these reciprocal measures are often viewed through the prism of imports from countries with which the European Union (EU) wishes to strengthen its trade, such as Canada and the Mercosur member states. However, if these mirror clauses are adopted, they must apply to all countries that export food to the EU; otherwise, they would create distortions of competition, condemnable at the World Trade Organization (WTO), between the Union's trading partners. It is therefore appropriate to consider the repercussions that these measures could have on developing countries (DCs), and more particularly the least developed countries (LDCs).

Much stricter European standards

Many French farmers and national representatives denounce the production standards imposed on our farmers, which they believe are too strict, and which they hold responsible for the loss of competitiveness of French agriculture.[1]It is true that European standards are, on the whole, more rigorous than elsewhere. Many examples could be cited to support this point: the ban on the use of hormones in livestock farming, regulations on animal transport, the prohibited use of animal meal to feed livestock.[2], maximum pesticide residue limits that are more stringent than in third countries, or the rules applicable to genetically modified organisms, which considerably curb their production. This framework is partly based on the precautionary principle which, in Europe, consists of taking restrictive measures (prohibition of production, sale) in the event that doubt persists about the harmful nature of a product on the environment or human health, even if the scientific evidence is insufficient[3]Globally, it seems that only the EU has such a radical interpretation of the precautionary principle, because elsewhere, scientific evidence prevails over risk prevention.

The Green Deal (Green Deal), launched in December 2019 by the Von der Leyen Commission, raises the bar even further. Its agricultural implementation, the strategy Farm to Fork (accompanied by a set of other strategies partly integrating agriculture[4]), aims to strengthen the environmental and health requirements imposed on European farmers. The objectives include reducing the use of fertilizers and pesticides, increasing the area devoted to organic farming, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving animal welfare.

Engage business partners in the ecological transition

The European Commission is not alarmed by the risk of a loss of competitiveness in agriculture in the EU. The positions it puts forward in Section 4 of the Communication on the strategy Farm to Fork[5] or in its communication of February 18, 2021 on a new European trade policy “open, sustainable and firm”[6] show, on the contrary, its assurance regarding the compatibility between the development of EU trade and its environmental policy. In light of these documents, it is understandable that the Commission considers the EU as a normative power, capable of imposing its standards in the global trade of food products[7]The Commission's argument on this conciliation between Green Deal and trade can be understood through the prism of a triptych:

The Commission therefore appears optimistic about Europe's potential to influence its partners and work closely with them to commit to the ecological transition. But aren't these ambitions, however legitimate they may seem, a way for the EU to reassure itself about the choices it is making?

Mirror clauses: a spoiled child's wish?

In the eyes of developing countries, mirror clauses risk being perceived as technical barriers to trade in agricultural products. They would undoubtedly be all the less well received given that the divergence of interests with developed countries is not new. It was this confrontation that, in the WTO negotiations, led to the failure of the Doha Round, the objective of which was to facilitate access for food products from the South to markets in the North. Developing countries repeatedly criticize the agricultural protectionism of developed countries. India, China, Russia, and the Cairns Group countries, in particular, contest the domestic support measures used by developed countries because of the distortions of competition they generate.[8]From their point of view, mirror clauses would only worsen the disadvantaged position of developing countries in global agricultural trade.

Beyond the potential trade consequences of these measures, it is worth considering their symbolic significance. Imposing production standards on third countries could be understood as an attack on their sovereignty, as it would constitute a form of interference in their legislation. This argument applies to all countries, regardless of their level of development, on which the EU would impose its mirror clauses. However, the question of the legitimacy of imposing this type of measure on the least developed countries is even more relevant since, in order to integrate into the global trade game, these countries are striving to strengthen the competitiveness of their agriculture by applying the recipes of a "green revolution" implemented, in their own time and in their own way, by developed countries. Some might even consider that imposing reciprocal production standards on LDCs would amount to a form of neo-colonialism.

Should we also remember that, in the poorest countries, environmental protection comes second to food security? In 2020, the number of people suffering from hunger increased by 118 million; in South Asia, 16.1% of the population is undernourished, a figure that rises to 24.1% in sub-Saharan Africa.[9]In the pyramid of needs, known as Maslow's pyramid, the needs of LDCs are classified at the bottom ("physiological needs"), those of developed countries - relating to sustainable development - are placed at the top ("achievement needs").[10]Before integrating ecological issues, developing countries seek to feed their population.

Finally, it is important to remember that international health and environmental standards already exist: the Codex Alimentarius, the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the World Organisation for Animal Health's Terrestrial Animal Health Code, the International Plant Protection Convention, and certain ISO standards (these are issued by a private organization and are therefore voluntary). While European standards are sometimes more demanding than those set out in these texts, it is not in the interest of developing countries to go further than what is recommended at the international level. Moreover, at the WTO, they benefit from "special and differential treatment" allowing them to liberalize their trade in agricultural products less extensively and more gradually than developed countries. To facilitate the adaptation of developing countries to new environmental and health requirements, developed countries should provide them with financial support. This aid already exists, thanks to the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDS), to which Germany has just paid 150,000 euros.[11], but the available funding is insufficient compared to the efforts required to transition towards greater sustainability of agriculture in developing countries.

The other side of the mirror

Until now, we have assumed that developing countries export food to developed countries, and that imposing mirror clauses on them would only hinder their development. Let us now look at things the other way around, from the perspective of European exports to these countries. As we have already pointed out, the strategy Farm to Fork will surely contribute to deteriorating the competitiveness of European agriculture. If comprehensive impact studies are still lacking[12], several reports, including those from the US Department of Agriculture and the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, predict a decline in European agricultural production of 5 to 15 %. A decline in production means, in fact, an increase in costs and in fine, prices. European foodstuffs will therefore be much less attractive to developing countries that depend on external supplies to ensure their food security. There is a risk that they will then turn to exporting countries that are much less concerned about environmental protection and human health and whose production is, in fact, less expensive than that of the EU.

Agriculture is a geopolitical weapon. The United States, Brazil, China, and Russia have understood that feeding the world is a way to exert influence on the international stage. If the EU introduces mirror clauses, these new agricultural powers will turn away from the EU market and seek to conquer new markets in which European exporters have long been established.

Mirror clauses could therefore have economic consequences for European agriculture, but also, more broadly, geopolitical implications for the EU. The EU may no longer be the leading exporter of agri-food products, a position that currently allows it to contribute to global food security and ensure the political stability of certain countries.[13].

In any case, implementing mirror clauses will take time. Developing countries cannot strengthen their health and environmental standards as quickly as developed countries, especially since their priority is above all to ensure their food security. But in the face of the climate emergency, can we still talk about an adaptation period? Countries in the Global South will only quickly engage in the ecological transition if countries in the Global North agree to help them. In this regard, the results of COP 26 in Glasgow do not give cause for optimism.